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This  paper  applies  an  equilibrium  quality  theory  for  differentiated 
products  to  estimate  the  willingness  to  pay  for  improvements  in  the  air 
quality  of  Chicago,  Cleveland,  Dallas,  Houston,  and  Indianapolis.  The 
empirical  results  show  (i)  that  the  structural  approach  and  the  standard 
non-structural  approach  give  very  different  benefit  figures  even  for  small 
improvements  in  air  quality,  and  (ii)  that  a  uniform  improvement  in  air 
quality  implies  significant  distributional  effects. I. Introduction  and  Summary. 
Houthakker  (1952)  assumed  that  the  characteristics  of  commodities 
provide  utility  to  individuals  and  introduced  a new  approach  to  the problem 
of  quality  variation  and  to  the  theory  of  consumer  behavior.  This  new 
approach  to  the  theory  of  individual  choices  helps  to  explain  a  number  of 
phenomena  that the  traditional  economic  theory  cannot  easily  explain. 
In  recent  years,  several  economists  have  adopted  the  new  approach  to 
the  theory  of  individual  choices  and  have  extended  Houthakker's  analysis  to 
study  consumer  behavior.  For  example,  Becker  (1965),  Lancaster  (1966),  and 
Muth  (1966)  assumed  that  commodities  traded  in  the  market  do  not  posses 
final  consumption  attributes  and  that consumers  are also  producers,  that  is, 
the consumers  are  assumed  to use  the commodities  purchased  in  the market  as 
inputs  into a self-production  function  for ultimate  characteristics.  Becker, 
Lancaster,  and  Muth  did  not  study  producer  behavior  and  the  properties  of 
market  equilibrium.  Rosen  (1976)  studies  both  consumer  and producer  behavior 
and  the  properties  of  market  equilibrium.  Unlike  the  previous  work  in  the 
area,  Rosen  assumes  that  consumers  are  not  producers  and  that  all  the 
commodities  with  their  ultimate  characteristics  are  readily  available  and 
traded  in the market. 
Epple  (1987)  demonstrates  that  most  of  the work  that  uses  the hedonic 
approach  is  unsatisfying  because  the  estimation  methods  do  not  yield 
consistent  estimates.  Bartik  (1987)  and Palmquist  (1984)  are  two exceptions. 
With  few  exceptions,  the hedonic  approach  has not  been  analyzed  thoroughly, 
3 complete  hedonic  equilibrium  models  have  not been  estimated  and  none  of  the 
previous  application  contains  a  structural  analysis.  Depending  on  the 
structure  of  the economy  and on  the questions  that we want  to address,  we  do 
not  always  need  to  compute  closed-form  solutions  and  make  a  structural 
analysis.  For example,  the standard  approach  can estimate  the price  equation 
and  the  parameters  of  the  demand  for  product  characteristics.  However, 
structural  analysis  is needed  to compute  the effects 
parameters.  Changes  in  exogenous  parameters  change 
distribution  and  non-structural  approaches  cannot 
changes. 
of changes  in exogenous 
the  equilibrium  price 
take  account  of  such 
Tinbergen  (1959)  provided  the  earliest  contribution  to  the  formulation 
and  solution  of  hedonic  equilibrium  models  and  Epple  (1984)  generalizes 
Tinbergen's  model  to  treat  a  commodity  with  an  arbitrary  number  of 
attributes  and  an  endogenous  1  supply  for product  characteristics  .  However, 
these  models  have  not  been  used  for  empirical  work  because  they  have 
several  restrictive  features.  Namely,  1) the cross  partial  derivative  of  the 
utility  function  with  respect  to  the  quality  characteristics  of  the 
differentiated  good  and  the numeraire  good  is zero,  2)  the marginal  utility 
with  respect  to the  numeraire  good  is constant  (hence  the  income  elasticity 
of  demand  for  the  product  is  zero),  3)  the variance-covariance  matrices  of 
the  exogenously  given  distributions  have  to  be  diagonal  or  satisfy  other 
restrictions,  4)  the number  of consumer  characteristics  equals  the number  of 
product  characteristics,  and  5)  the  price  equation  parameters  are  not 
unique. 
4 This  paper  presents  an  equilibrium  model  for  the  differentiated  good 
housing.  This  model  assumes  that  a  linear  function  maps  physical 
characteristics  into  a  scalar  quality  indes  and  that  economic  agents  care 
only  about  the  quality  of  the differentiated  good  that  they  purchase.  While 
this  is  a  strong  assumption  that  is  not  present  in  the  Tinbergen-Epple's 
formulation,  this  quality  index  technology  allows  me  to  impose  weaker  a 
priori  restrictions  in other  respects.  The  result  is a housing  model  with  a 
closed-form  solution  that  does  not  have  the  five  restrictive  features 
enumerated..above.  In addition  to a vector  of  consumer  characteristics,  this 
model  uses  consumer  income  to distinguish  individuals. 
This  model  uses  an  analytically  consistent  description  of  the  hedonic 
property  value  model  ij  to  estimate  the  utility  and  the  equilibrium  price 
and  demand  functions  and  ii)  to  investigate  how  far one  can  go with  closed- 
form solutions  and how well  the resulting  model  fits  the data. 
results  are  used  for  an  analysis  of  the housing  market  and an 
The  empirical 
estimation  of 
the  willingness  to  pay  for  air  quality  improvements  in Chicago  (Illinois), 
Cleveland  (Ohio),  Dallas  (Texas),  Houston  (Texas),  and  Indianapolis 
(Indiana). 
There  are  many  different  methods  one  could  use  to  characterize  the 
hedonic  equilibrium.  One would  be  to empirically  approximate  the features  of 
the price  function  using  fitting  criteria  to derive  it. This  method  provides 
more  flexibility  in  letting  the  data  determine  the  price  equation  and 
willingness  to  pay  functional  forms  at  the  cost  of  not  being  able  to  test 
whether  the assumed  functional  forms  are consistent  among  themselves  and  the 
5 underlying  economic  structure.  Another  method,  that  is  followed  by  this 
paper,  makes  prior  assumptions  about  the  characteristics  of  the  economic 
agents  interacting  to form  the equilibrium,  uses  that  to derive  the  form  of 
the  equilibrium  hedonic  function,  and  then  estimates  only  that.  Imposing 
these  prior  restrictions  helps  through  the  additional  theoretical 
information  that  is  essential  in  the  derivation  of  the willingness  to  pay 
results. 
There  is  an  inevitable  trade 
required  to  derive  an  analytically 
function.  In  this  paper,  all  of  the 
off  associated  with  a  simplification 
consistent  form  for  a  hedonic  price 
analysis  underlying  the  derivation  of 
the  equilibrium  price  equation  and  the method  for estimating  the  parameters 
of  the  equilibrium  price  equation,  of  the  utility  function,  and  of  the 
associated  willingness  to pay  function  rest  on  the  assumptions  1)  that  the 
utility  function  is  quadratic,  2)  that  the  vector  of  product 
characteristics  associated  with  the  housing  and  the  vector  of  family  size 
and  income  follow  multivariate  normal  distributions  in each  city,  and  3)  the 
linearity  of  the housing  quality  variable  entering  the utility  function.  The 
latter  is  what  allows  me  to  reduce  a  not-diagonal  variance-covariance 
structure  into  a  simple  variance  and  apply  the basic  argument  developed  in 
Epple  (1984).  A  quadratic  utility  function  and  normality  distributional 
assumptions  also  characterize  Epple's  (1984) analysis. 
Quigley  (1982)  uses  an  alternative  strategy  to  derive  a  method  for 
estimating  individual  preferences  and  the price  of a differentiated  product. 
This  method,  as  well  as  the  model  presented  in  Polinsky  and  Rubinfeld 
6 (1977)  t  cannot  be  used  for  a  general  equilibrium  analysis  because  they  do 
not  provide  consistent  estimates  of  the equilibrium  price  equation. 
Section  II  introduces  the  theoretical  housing  model  that  is  used  to 
illustrate  the  kind  of  analysis  that  the  structural  approach  can  perform. 
This  model  assumes  that  the  income  and  the  supply  distributions  are 
exogenous  and 
differentiated 
that  consumers  use  the  services  of  only  one  unit  of  the 
good.  However,  the  same  basic  model  can  be  extended  to relax 
these  assumptions  (see  Giannias  (1987)).  An  application  of  the  model  is 
discussed  in Section  III.  Concluding  remarks  are presented  in Section  IV. 
II. The  Economic  Model. 
The  differentiated  good  housing  can be  accurately  described  by  a  (lxm) 
vector  of  objectively  measured  characteristics,  v.  Individuals  consume  one 
unit  of housing  and  the numeraire  good,  x.  It is assumed  that  they  care  only 
about  the  quality 
housing  market  is 
linear  function  of 
of  the  differentiated  good  housing,  h,  and  that  the 
competitive.  The  housing  quality,  h,  is  a  scalar  and  a 
the vector  of physical  characteristics,  v,  that  is, 
h-Ev'  (1) 
where  E  is  a  (lxm)  vector  of  parameters  and  v'  is  the  transpose  of  v. 
(Hereafter,  a  prime  II"  will  always  denote  the  transpose  of  a  vector  or 
matrix).  Equation  (1) is a key assumption  of the model.  The  equation  is less 
restrictive  than  might  at  first  appear  since  an  element  of  v  can  be  an 
arbitrary  function  of  measured  product  characteristics.  The  supply  for 
housing  characteristics  is exogenously  given  and  the vector  v  is  assumed  to 
7 follow  an  exogenously  given  normal  distribution  with  a  mean  v  and  a 
variance-covariance  matrix  Xv.  The  latter  assumption  and  (1) imply  that  the 
aggregate  supply  for  housing  quality  follows  a  normal  distribution  with  a 
2 
mean  h and a variance  0  .  Let  it be 
g(h)  - N(h,a2) 
where  h -  E v'  ,  and u 
2 
-  E c,  e'. 
(2) 
The  model  lets  consumers  have  different  preferences  and  income.  Each 
consumer  can  be  described  by  a  vector  z,  where  z  =  [a  I]  is  a  [lx(n+l)] 
vector,  I  is  the  consumer  income,  and  a  is  a  (lxn)  vector  of  utility 
parameters  that  specifies  the  type  of  a  consumer.  z  is assumed  to  follow  a 
multi-normal  distribution  with  a mean  z and a variance-covariance  matrix  Cz. 
U(h,x;a)  is the utility  that an a-type  consumer  obtains  from  x and  from 
the  services  of  an h-quality  house.  The  utility  function  is assumed  to be  a 
quadratic  of the following  form: 
U(h,x;a)  = 6 +  (r0 + rl a') h + 0.5 < h2 + x h  (3) 
where  6, 
r0' 
and  <  are  utility  parameters  (scalars),  and  rl  is  a  (lxn) 
vector  of utility  parameters. 
An  a-type  consumer  with  an  I  annual  income  solves  the  following 
optimization  problem: 
max  U(h,x;a)  (4) 
with  respect  to  h, x 
subject  to  I = 12 P(h) + 365 x  and 
P(h) = 7ro  + 7r1  h 
a where  Ri  is  a  parameter,  J  =  1,  2,  P(h)  is  the  equilibrium  housing  price 
equation  (it  is  a  function  of  housing  quality  and  equal  to  gross  monthly 
rent  including  utilities),  12  is the number  of months  in  a year,  and  365  is 
the number  of days  in a year. 
The  optimum  decisions  of  housing  sellers  and  consumers  depend  on  the 
equilibrium  housing 
buyers  and  sellers 
economic  agents  can 
are  feasible. 
price  equation  P(h) which  is determined  so  that  housing 
are  perfectly  matched.  In  equilibrium,  no  one  of  the 
improTre  his  position  and all  of  their  optimum  decisions 
Solving  the  utility  maximization  problem,  it  is  obtained  that  the 
demand  for h  is given  by  the following  equation: 
h =  (TO  - ~0 + t z')/(2  x1  - <)  0) 
where  t -  [CL  l/365]  is a  [lx(n+l)]  vector. 
The  normality  of  z and  (5)  imply  that  the aggregate  demand  for housing 
quality  follows  a normal  distribution.  Let  it be  f(h).  The  condition  for an 
equilibrium  in  the  market  described  above  is:  aggregate  demand  for  housing 
quality  -  aggregate  supply  for  housing  quality,  that  is  ,  f(h)dh  = g(h)dh. 
P(h)  = ~0 + rl h  is  the  equilibrium  housing  price  equation2  because  it sets 
the  mean  and  variance  of 
variance  of  the aggregate 
*1 
=  (365/24) 
=0 
=  (365/12) 
the  aggregate  demand  for h  equal  the mean  and  the 
supply  for h respectively,  where3 
[< +  ( t C  t' / g2  )O.']  ,  and 
Z 
K.  -  +  t  z'  -  (2 R 
1 - 0  hl 
(6) 
(7) The  housing  price  equation  given  above  is  an  equilibrium  price 
relationship  that  is determined  by  the  dis  tribution  of  consumer  tastes  and 
income,  and  by  the  distribution  of housing  characteristics.  In  Section  III, 
the  model  described  above  is  used  for  a  study  of  the  residential  housing 
market  and  an  illustration  of  the  method  that can be  applied  for  estimating 
the willingness  to pay  for changes  in esogenous  parameters,  namely,  the mean 
of  the air  quality  distribution. 
III.An  application. 
The  model  that  is  presented  in  the  previous  section  can  be  used  for  a 
study  of  the  residential  housing  market  of  Chicago  (Illinois),  Cleveland 
(Ohio),  Dallas  (Texas),  Houston  (Texas),  and  Indianapolis  (Indiana).  The 
empirical  results  will  be used  to investigate  the willingness  to pay  for air 
quality  improvements  in these  cities. 
1II.A.  Additional  Assumptions  and Definitions. 
It  is  assumed  that  there  is  no  migration  among  cities  and  that  the 
differentiated  product  residential  housing  can be  described  by  a vector  of 
characteristics  v,  where  v  =  [v 
1 v2 v31'  v1 
is the size  of  the housing  unit 
(number  of  rooms),  v2  is an  air  quality  index,  and  v3  is the  travel  time  to 
work  (measured  in  minutes).  v2  equals  the  inverse  of  the  air  pollution 
variable  total  suspended  particulate  matter.  The  housing  quality  equation 
is  given  in  (l),  where  c  =  [co  ~1  ~~1.  The  parameters  of  the  quality 
equation  should  be  indexed  by  j,  where  j  =  Chicago,  Cleveland,  Dallas, 
10 Houston,  Indianapolis.  However,  the subscript  j has been  dropped  to simplify 
the notation. 
Consumer  preferences  are  described  by  the  utility  function  given  in 
equation  (3).  The  parameter  a  is  defined  to be  the  number  of  persons  in  a 
family  (a scalar).  The parameters  of  the utility  function  and  the parameters 
of  the  distributions  of  the  vector  [a  I]  and  of  the  vector  of  housing 
characteristics,  v,  should  also  be  indesed  by  j,  where  j  =  Chicago, 
Cleveland,  Dallas,  Houston,  Indianapolis.  As above,  the subscript  j has been 
dropped  to simplify  the notation.  A consumer  solves  the optimization  problem 
given  in  (4). 
1II.B.  The  Econometric  Model. 
To  obtain  the  equilibrium  demand  for housing  quality,  I substitute  (6) 
and  (7)  into  (5). Assuming  an  additive  error  term on  the price  equation  and 
on  the equilibrium  demand  for housing  quality,  I obtain: 
where 
P-  c + B, v1 + B, v2 + 8, v3 + u1 
h-7-  c3a-  e41+u2 
c =  (365/12)  [CO + cl ; +  (T/365)  - A  E ?] 
B  i+l 
=  (365/24)  (< + A)  Ei  ,  for i Q 0, 1, 2 
- 
7-v  1 
+  cl v2  + c2 v3 + c3 a + E4 I 
E3 -  - rl/A 
c4 - 
- l/(365  A) 








a  "  W over  a variable  denotes  the  mean  of  the variable,  and  u  1 
and  u 
2 
are 
11 the  econometric  errors  of  the  first  and  second  equation  respectively.  The 
complete  model  consists  of equations  (l),  (8), and  (9). 
Among  the parameters  of  the  equilibrium  price  equation,  the  parameters 
of  the  equilibrium  demand  for  housing  quality,  and  the  parameters  of  the 
quality  index  equation,  8,,  el,  and  y  are  assumed  to be  the  only  ones  that 
can be  different  across  cities.  Moreover,  I make  the fixed  effect  assumption 
that  these  three  parameters  satisfy  the following: 
4 
'2 = B,O + 'i,l  P*i  di  (15) 
4 
Y  =  '10 + 'i,l  'li di 
4 
Y  *  Y10  +  ‘i,l  Yli  di 
(16) 
(17) 
where  p2j,  elj,  and  ylj  are  exogenously  given  parameters  (they  are  some  of 
the  parameters  that  I want  to  estimate)  for j =  0,  1,  2,  3,  4,  and  dl  =  1 
for  Chicago  and  0 else,  d2 =  1 for  Cleveland  and  0 else,  d3 =  1 for  Dallas 
and  0 else,  and d4 = 1 for Indianapolis  and 0 else 
Differences  in  esogenous  factors,  for  example,  humidity,  temperature, 
and  rainfall,  can  make  the  parameter  of  the  quality  index  equation  E 
1 be 
different  across  cities.  For  the  residential  housing  market,  I assume  that 
the quality  of housing  is a latent  variable.  Without  loss of generality,  the 
quality  of housing  can be normalized  by  setting  co equal  to 1. 
The  econometric  errors  are  assumed  to  satisfy:  (Al)  u1  and  u2  are 
uncorrelated,  (A2)  a and  I are  uncorrelated  to u 
1 
and  u 
2' and  (A3) vl,  v2, 
and  v 
3 
are  uncorrelated  to  u 
1' 
These  assumptions  may  be  motivated,  for 
example,  by  thinking  of  u1  as  a  measurement  error  in  price  and  u2  as 
12 unmeasured  buyer  characteristics  that  are  uncorrelated  with  measured  buyer 
characteristics. 
1II.C.  Estimation  of  the Reduced  Form  Equations. 
To  estimate  the  complete  model,  I  apply  a  four  step  estimation 
procedure.  This  estimation  method  yields  consistent  parameter  estimates  and 
uses  the  restrictions  that  are  implied  by  the  structure  of  the  model, 
namely, 
cl - 92/B,  ,  and  (18) 
E2 = 83/P,  (19) 
I  estimate  the  model  for  Chicago  (Illinois),  Cleveland  (Ohio),  Dallas 
(Texas),  Houston  (Texas),  and Indianapolis  (Indiana)  using  1980  census  tract 
data  on  gross  rental  prices,  number  of  rooms,  travel  time  to work,  size  of 
the  family,  and  income,  and  1979  SAROAD  based  data  on  air  pollution.  To 
obtain  data  concerning  the  annual  arithmetic  mean  of  total  suspended 
particulate  (measured  in  microgram  per  cubic  meter)  all  the  monitoring 
stations  in these  five  cities  (given  their  addresses)  were  located  according 
to census  tract.  The  readings  for  these census  tracts  were  used  to represent 
pollution  readings  in  adjacent  census  tracts  since  most  cities  contain  a 
limited  number  of  monitoring  stations.  If  a  census  tract  was  adjacent  to 
more  than  one  census  tract  containing  a  monitoring  station,  then  the 
average  of  the  readings  was  used.  These  readings  were  then  inverted,  such 
that  the figures  reflect  air quality  instead  of air pollution. 
13 Unlike  other  work,  e.g.,  Harrison  and  Rubinfeld  (1978),  the  model  has 
nice  aggregation  properties  that  allow  mean  values  of  census  tract  data  to 
be  used.  If micro  data  on  individual  consumers  is not  available,  the use  of 
census  tract  data  can be  justified  since  1)  the price  equation  is linear  in 
product  characteristics,  and  2)  the  equilibrium  demand  for  product  quality 
is linear  in consumer  income  and  family  size. The  estimation  method  follows. 
STEP  1:  I estimate  the price  equation  by  ordinary  least  squares  (which 
is  appropriate  under  assumption  A3).  The  parameter  estimates  are  given  in 
Table  1. They  imply  that  the rentai  price  equation  for each  city  is given  by 
the following  equation: 
P = 85 06 + 19.49 vl 
+ B, v2 
- 4.56 v3  (20) 
where  the value  of  the parameter  /3,  for each city  is given  in Table  2. 
STEP  2: Given  (18) and  (19) and  the results  of  the previous  step,  I can 
obtain  estimates  for  E 
1 
and  E 
2' 
This  and  the normalization 
to obtain  that  the  housing  quality  index  equation  for each 
the following  equation: 
h -v  1 +  cl v2  - 0.23 v3 
EO 
- 1 enable  me 
city  is given  by 
(21) 
where  the value  of  the parameter  e  1 for each city  is given  in Table  2. 
STEP  3:  I  use  the  above  specified  housing  quality  equations  to 
construct  an  estimated  series  for  the housing  quality  for  each  census  tract 
of my data  set. 
STEP  4:  I use  the housing  quality  indices  that  I obtained  in step  3 to 
estimate  equation  (9).  Ordinary  least  squares  is  appropriate  under 
assumptions  Al-A3.  Deviations  between  the  actual  housing  quality  and  its 
estimate  (estimated  from  equation  (21))  are  measurement  errors  in  the 
14 dependent  variable  in  equation  (9) and  hence  do  not 
of  ordinary  least  squares.  The  parameter  estimates 
They  imply  that  the  equilibrium  demand  equation  for 
the following  equation: 
h = y + 0.138  a + 0.000139  I 
affect  the  consistency 
are  given  in  Table  3. 
each  city  is  given  by 
(22) 
where  the value  of  the parameter  y  for each  city  is given  in Table  2. 
To  see  if  the model  makes  a significant  contribution  to explaining  the 
data,  I  tested  the  hypothesis  that  all  the parameters  of  equation  (8)  are 
zero,  that  is, p 
1 
- p,,  = p,,  - ,3,,  = p,, = p24 = P, - 0. An  F-test  rejects 
that  hypothesis  at  the  1%  significance 
hypothesis  (at  the  1%  significance 
equation  (9) equal  zero. 
level.  A  similar  F-test  rejects  the 
level)  that  all  the  parameters  of 
The  t-statistics  (see  Tables  1  and  3)  show  that  the  size  of  a  house 
(number  of  rooms)  and  the  travel  time  to work  variable  (which  are  expected 
to  be  the  main  determinants  of  the  rent),  as well  as  the  income  (i;hich is 
expected  to  be  the  main  determinant  of  the  equilibrium  demand  for  housing 
quality)  are  significant  at  the  1%  significance  level.  Moreover,  all 
coefficients  have  the  anticipated  signs  in  both  equations  (8) and  (9)  and 
the  qualitative  properties  of  the  model  are  as  one  would  intuitively 
4  expect  . 
Various  alternative  hedonic  specifications  were  estimated  pooling  the 
same  data.  The  equation  given  in Table  1 did not  change  significantly  under 
the alternative  specifications.  To  investigate  for possible  non-linearities, 
15 the following  equation  is estimated:  P = b0 + Ci bi vi+  C..  b..  v. v.. An  F- 
iJ  iJ  i  J 
test  provides  evidence  in  favor  of  the null  hypothesis  that  b..  = 0 for all 
iJ 
i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2,  3. 
Blomquist  and  al  (1985)  and  (1988)  have  estimated  (among  others)  a 
housing  hedonic  equation  that  includes  housing  structural  characteristics, 
urban  characteristics,  climatic  conditions,  and  environmental  variables. 
Their  analysis  includes  the  five  cities  that  are  considered  in  this  paper. 
Their  (1985) paper  assumes  a log-log  functional  form  for  the hedonic  housing 
equation  and  in their  (1988)  paper  they have  applied  the  Box-Cox  procedure, 
see  Box  and  Cox  (1962).  In both  papers,  they have  used  1980  Census  earnings 
and  housing  micro  data  for  individuals.  However,  their  air  pollution 
variable  is more  aggregate  than  the one  that  it has  been  used  in this paper 
(the  unit  observation  for  their  air  pollution  variable  is  the  county  or 
SMSA;  the  same  is  true  for  other  variables  as  well).  Table  4  gives  the 
elasticities  of  rental  prices  with  respect  to  number  of  rooms  and  air 
quality,  e(P,vl)  and  e(P,v,)  respectively,  that are  implied  by  the empirical 
results  of  this  paper  and  the  work  of  Blomquist  and  a15.  Tables  4  shows 
significantly  different  figures  for  the elasticities  of  rents  with  respect 
to air quality6. 
1V.D.  Structural  Analysis. 
The  parameter  estimates  that  I obtained  in  the  previous  section  allow 
me  to  analyze  the  structure  of  the  housing  market  of  Chicago,  Cle7reland, 
Dallas,  Houston,  and  Indianapolis,  and to specify  how  that  structure  depends 
16 on  the mean  of  the air quality  distribution  of each city.  The  latter  enables 
me  to address  interesting  questions  that a non-structural  approach  cannot. 
Given  the  parameter  estimates  obtained  in  Section  1V.C.  and  equations 
(lO)-(19),  I  can  compute  the  parameters  of  the  utility  function  and  the 
equilibrium  demand  for  the  numeraire  good'.  For  each  city,  the  equilibrium 
demand  for  the  numeraire  good  and  the  utility  functions8  are  respectively 
given  by  the following  equations: 
x-d-  0.088  a + 0.00265  I  ,  and 
U(h,x;a)  -  6 +  (r. + 2.72 a) h  - 9.21 h2 + x h  (23) 
where  the values  of  the parameters  d and co for each  city  are  given  in Table 
2. We  can now  see  that  1) the rent  is positively  related  to  the quality  of a 
house',  2)  the equilibrium  demand  for housing  quality  is positively  related 
to  the  size  of  the  family  and  income  (see  equation  (22)),  3)  the  housing 
quality  is  positively  related  to  air  quality  and  negatively  to  travel  time 
to  work  (see  equation  (21)),  and  4)  the  marginal  utility  with  respect  to 
housing  quality  is positively  related  to  the size  of  a  family  (see equation 
(23). These  qualitatitive  properties  are as one would  intuitively  expect  10  . 
The preceding  results  can be used  in a structural  analysis  of  the value 
of  a  change  in  air  quality.  To  illustrate  that,  I  first  repeat  the  above 
calculations  treating  mean  air quality,  v2,  as a variable  rather  than  fixing 
it  at  its  sample  mean  of  (see  Table  2  for  the  mean  air  quality  of  each 
city).  The  results  follow. 
The  parameters  A,  ro,  rl,  cl,  c2, and  < do not  change  because  they  do 
17 not  depend  on  the mean  air  quality.  The  housing  quality  index  equations  and 
the  utility  functions  are  given  in  (21)  and  (23)  respectively.  The 
equilibrium  rental  price  equations,  the  equilibrium  demand  for  housing 
quality  equations,  and  the  equilibrium  demand  for  the  numeraire  good 
equations  are  functions  of  the mean  air quality.  They  are  respectively  equal 
to:  P-  r + k v2 + 19.49 h 
h = s + m J,  + 0.138  a + 0.000139  I 
x=y+nv 
2 
- 0.088  a + 0.00263  I 
where  the values  of  the  parameters  r,  k,  s, m,  y 




and  n  for  each  city  are 
To  illustrate  how  to  perform  a  general  equilibrium  analysis  that  is 
accomodated  by  the model,  these  results  are used  to compute  the willingness 
to  pay  for  an  improvement  in  air  quality.  The  purpose  of  this  is  not  to 
determine  the  precise  dollar  figure  of  the  willingness  to  pay  for  an 
improvement  in  air  quality.  Rather,  it  is  to constrast  this  method  to  the 
previous  (partial  equilibrium)  common  practice  for computing  benefits. 
A  consumer's  willingness  to  pay  for  a y%  improvement  in  the  mean  air 
quality  of  a  city,  W,  is  defined  to  be  the  solution  to  the  following 
equation: 
V(a,I,G2)  = V(  a,  I + W, G 
2 
+ V2  (y/100)  )  (27) 
- 
where  V(a,I,v  )  is  the  equilibrium  indirect  utility  function  of  an  [a I]- 
2 
consumer  given  the  mean  air  quality  of  a city,  v2.  That  is,  the  consumer's 
benefit  from  a y%  change  in  the mean  air  quality  is the part  of his  income 
that  he  is  willing  to  give  up  so  that  the  utility  after  the  y%  change, 
18 taking  account  of  equilibrium  price  adjustments,  equals  the  utili:y  before 
the y%  change. 
The  willingness  to pay  of  the mean  household  of  each  city  for a y%  air 
quality  improvement",  W(Y%),  is computed  for y = 1, 2.5,  5, 7.5,  10, 12.5, 
and  15  using  numerical  procedures  that  are  available  in  the  TKSolver 
computer  package.  The results  are  summarized  in Figure  1. They  indicate  that 
the  willingness  to  pay  for  an  air  quality  improvement  in  Cleveland  and 
Indianapolis  is significantly  lower  than  the willingness  to pay  for the same 
air  quality  improvement  in  Chicago,  Dallas,  and  Houston,  for  all  y%  air 
quality  improvements. 
A  uniform  air  quality  improvement  i)  shifts  the  price  equation 
downwards  (see  equation  (24))  and  ii)  increases  the  quality  of  all  houses 
(see  equation(21)). 
decrease  in the rent 
The  empirical  results  imply  that  the  net  effect  is  a 
of all houses.  Table  5 gives  the willingness  to pay  for 
a 1%  air  quality  improvement,  W(l%),  as well  as  the annual  decrease  in rent 
revenues  of  the  mean  house  of  each  city  that  is  implied  by  that  1%  air 
quality  improvement,  AR(l%).  The  third  column  of  Table  5  gives  the  net 
social  benefit  per  household12,  NSB(l%),  and  the  fourth  column  gives  the 
willingness  to pay  that a standard  non-structural  approach  would  yield  given 
the price  equation  in Table  1. That  is, the figures  of  the fourth  column  are 
computed  in the following  way  13: w = 12 p,  (DV), where  ,5,  is the coefficient 
of  the  air  quality  variable  of  equation  (20)  (given  in  Table  2)  and  DV  is 
the  change  in  the  mean  air  quality,  DV  =  1%.  The  benefit  figures  of  the 
fourth  column  are  97%  below  the  benefit  figures  based  on  the  structural 
19 model  (first  column  of  Table  5).  This  difference  arises  only  because  of 
differences  in  method  of  calculation,  since  the  same  price  equation 
parameters  were  used  for  both  calculations.  Consequently,  the  method  of 
computing  benefits  matters  a  lot  and  a  non-structural  approach  will  not 
necessarily  give  a good  approximation  to  the benefit  figure  that  is implied 
by  a structural  approach  even  for small  changes  in air quality. 
For  a  small  1%  air  quality  improvement,  it  is also  obtained  that  our 
results  are  consistent  with  the Pines  and Wines  (1976)  marginal  result  (see 
the  third  and  fourth  columns  of  Table  5).  Pines  and  Weiss  have  shown  that 
the  marginal  price  paid  for  an  amenity  improvement  that  is marginal  at  all 
locations  (even  if  large  in  the  sense  that  many  locations  are  improved), 
when  summed  over  all  improved  locations  will  give an accurate  measure  of net 
social  benefits.  Table  5 also  implies  that  the most  significant  effect  of an 
air  quality  improvement  is  an  enormous  distributional  effect  since  the 
figures  of  the  third  column  are  on  average  96%  below  the  figures  of  the 
first  column. 
IV. Conclusions. 
This  paper  presents  a  model  for  the  differentiated  good  housing  that 
makes  prior  assumptions  about  the  characteristics  of  the  economic  agents 
interacting  to form  the equilibrium  and uses  that to derive  and  estimate  the 
equilibrium  price  equation,  the  housing  quality  index  equation,  the 
equilibrium  demand  for  housing  quality,  and  the  parameters  of  the  utility 
function.  These  prior  restrictions  are  essential  in  the  estimation  of  the 
20 structural  model  and  the  derivation  of  the willingness  to  pay  results.  The 
empirical  results  indicate  (i)  that  there  is  a  significant  distributional 
effect  associated  with  a  uniform  improvement  in  air  quality  that  cannot  be 
identified  by  a  non-structural  approach,  and  (ii)  that  the  willingness  to 
pay  for  an  air  quality  improvement  in  Cleveland  and  Indianapolis  is  a  lot 
less  than  the  willingness  to  pay  for  the  same  air  quality  improvement  in 
Chicago,  Dallas,  and Houston.  It  is also  an  interesting  result  that  the  two 
methods  that  were  used  to  compute  benefits  give  very  different  benefit 
figures  for  a  small  1%  air  quality  improvement.  The  latter  indicates  that 
the  non-structural  approach  can  even  miscalculate  benefits  of  small  changes 
in the air quality  distribution. 
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N = 152 
R2 =  .51 
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6.027161  3.233549 
1767.226  7.234924 
9.261684  -4.920640 
1177.005  0.8845673 
1205.995  -5.719468 
896.7612  -4.092954 
1192.448  -7.001555 
36.63616  2.321720 












PAMMETER  VALUES AND STATISTICS FOR EACH CITY 
CHICAGO  CLEVELAND  DALLAS  HOUSTON  INDIANAPOLIS 
_______  -__------  ______  _____-_  ---_--_----- 
13826.88  5888.09  9115.34  12785.74  4436.75 
709.43  302.11  467.69  656.01  227.64 
-5.53  -3.11  -3.95  -4.51  -2.41 
-0.6088  -0.8009  -0.2652  -0.0927  -1.2599 
-102.26  -58.50  -75.06  -86.10  -44.70 
5231.34  2004.92  4767.51  5630.39  1845.56 
-425312.15  -181118.72 -280386  -393286.2  -136473.03 
13.91  -6.31  -11.76  -13.76  -5.35 
709.43  302.11  467.69  656.01  227.64 
-163.09  -61.87  -149.21  -176.3  -57.26 
13528.825  5761.24  8918.85  12510.12  4341.09 
1.95  1.84  2.19  2.5  1.85 
16928  10784  15795  15954  13889 
0.0121  0.0106  0.0167  0.0141  0.0129 
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TABLE 3 






d4  2.102350 










0.0000202607  6.878315 
0.133066  1.036389 
0.2822666  -2.923625 
0.2914920  4.807532 
0.2640562  2.114217 
0.3154746  6.664085 
0.5332514  -8.456927 
N = 152 
R2 -  .41 
24 TABLE 4 
PRICE ELASTICITIES WITH RESPECT TO AIR QUALITY 
AND NUMBER OF ROOXS 
Blomquist and al 
(1985)  (1988) 
_________________  ______ 
e(P,vl) 
_______ 
CHICAGO  0.42 
CLEVELAND  0.70 
DALLAS  0.35 
HOUSTON  0.35 
INDIANAPOLIS  0.62 
e(P,v2)  e(P,v,) 
-______  _______ 
0.74  0.30 
0.50  0.30 
0.73  0.30 
0.79  0.30 
0.45  0.30 
e(P,v2)  e(P,v2) 
_______  _  ______ 
0.121  0.23 
0.121  0.40 
0.121  0.13 
0.121  0.15 
0.121  0.43 
25 TABLE 5 
THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY OF THE MEAN HOUSEHOLD, THE CHANGE IN 
THE RENT REVENUES OF THE MEAN HOUSE, AND THE NET SOCIAL BENEFIT 
PER HOUSEHOLD THE ASSOCIATED WITH AN 1% AIR QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 
IN THE MEAN AIR QUALITY OF EACH CITY 
W(l%)  AR(l%)  NSB(l%)  w=12 p, 1% 
CHICAGO  615.6  597.36  18.24  20.1 
CLEVELAND  229.7  222.96  6.74  7.5 
DALLAS  562.8  543.60  19.2  18.3 
HOUSTON  709.6  683.92  25.68  21.6 
INDIANAPOLIS  212.2  204.48  7.72  6.9 
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29 ENDNOTES 
1. McConnell  and  Phipps  have  also  developed  a variety  of  extensions  to  the 
model  in unpublished  work. 
2. The  general  strategy  of  the proof  was  introduced  by  Tinbergen  (1959)  and 
extended  by  Epple  (1984). 
3.  There  are  two  solutions  that  satisfy  the  equilibrium  condition.  The  one 
of  them  is  rejected  because  it  does  not  satisfy  the  second  order  condition 
for utility  maximization. 
4.  For  the  residential  housing  market,  I expect  the  parameters  ~1,  ~2,  and 
11  to satisfy:  cl >  0,  c2 < 0,  and  rl > 0. That  is, I expect  1) the housing 
quality  to  increase  as  the  air  quality  increases,  2)  the housing  quality  to 
decrease  as  the  travel  time  to work  increases,  and  3)  the  utility  that  is 
obtained  from  each  additional  unit  of  housing  quality  to  increase  as  the 
size  of  a  family  increases.  The  parameter  estimates  obtained  in  this 
section  show  that  the  two  of  the  above  inequalities  are  satisfied.  In  the 
next  section,  it is shown  that the third of them  is also  satisfied. 
5. The  information  needed  to compute  the elasticity  of  rents with  respect  to 
the number  of rooms  is not  reported  in Blomquist  and  al  (1988). 
6.  The  elasticity  of  rents  with  respect  to  air  quality  predicted  by 
Blomquist  and  al  (1985)  and  (1988)  is  80%  and  51%  respectively  below  the 
30 elasticity  figures  predicted  by  the empirical  results  of  this  paper. 
7. The  equilibrium  demand  of  the numeraire  good  is obtained  from  the budget 
constraint  after  substituting  out  the  equilibrium  demand  for  housing 
quality. 
8.  The  intercept  of  the  marginal  utility  of  the  housing  quality  can  be 
different  across  cities  because  of  differences  in exogenous  parameters,  for 
example  humidity,  temperatures,  rainfall,  or  other  city  specific 
characteristics. 
9.  To  see  this  note  that  (18),  (19),  (20),  and  (21)  imply  the  following 
equation:  P = 85.06  + 19.49 h. 
10. Moreover,  the model  predicts  the following:  1) "Indianapolis,  Cleveland, 
Dallas,  Houston,  Chicago"  is  the order  in which  a household  (given  a family 
size  and  income)  would  order  the  five  cities  (from most  to least  desirable) 
according  to  the  housing  quality  that  he  can  enjoy  (buy  in equilibrium)  in 
each  city,  see  equation  (22),  2)  the  housing  quality  is  more  sensitive  to 
changes  in  air  quality  in  Chicago  and  less  in Houston,  Dallas,  Cleveland, 
and  Indianapolis  (the order  is from most  to least sensitive);  more  sensitive 
in  the  sense  that  a  unit  change  in  air  quality  changes  more  the  housing 
quality  in Chicago  than  in other  cities,  see equation  (21), and  3)  identical 
houses  (houses  described  by  the  same  travel  time  to work,  air  quality,  and 
number  of rooms  variables),  have  different  rental  prices  in each  city.  Rents 
are  more  expensive  in  Chicago  and  less  espensive  in  Houston,  Dallas, 
31 Cleveland,  and  Indianapolis  (the order  is from most  to least  expensive),  see 
equation  (20). 
11. NSB(l%)  = W(l%)  - AR(l%)  . 
12.  To  obtain  the  equilibrium  indirect  utility  function,  I  substitute  the 
equilibrium  demand  functions  for  housing  quality  and  numeraire  good, 
equations  (25)  and  (26)  respectively,  into  the  utility  function,  equation 
(23). Given  this equilibrium  indirect  utility  function,  equation  (27) can be 
obtained.  The  mean  income,  the  mean  number  of persons  in a  family,  and  the 
mean  air  quality  of  each  city  (see  Table  2)  are  substituted  into  (27)  to 
solve  for  the  willingness  to  pay  of  the  mean  household  for  several  air 
quality  improvements. 
13.  For  example,  this  approach  is used  by  Harrison  and  Rubinfeld  (1978),  p. 
92,  footnote  28.  That  is,  for  a  price  equation  that  is  linear  in  air 
quality,  they  do  not  use  their  four  step  procedural  model  to  compute 
benefit. 
32 